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Sadly, there are people in very bad medical 
conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are 
suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life 
to be at an acceptable level anymore. 
When people like this are kept alive by machines or 
other medical treatments, can it be morally 
permissible to let them die? 
Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can 
be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can 
sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some 
patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be 
permissible also.[1] This essay reviews these 
arguments. 
1. Passive Euthanasia 
Denying that passive euthanasia is ever morally 
permissible suggests that we must always do 
everything we can to try to keep someone alive, even 
if they are miserable, want to die, and say so. To 
many, that’s just cruel.[2] 
Passive euthanasia can be directly supported by both 
consequentialist (or utilitarian) and Kantian ethics.[3] 
For the consequentialist, the patient being out of 
their misery is a better consequence for them, and 
overall, than their staying alive: this decreases the 
total amount of pain and unhappiness in the world, 
and no other choice would produce more good, for 
them or overall. 
For a Kantian, letting them die respects 
their autonomy or decisions about matters that 
profoundly affect their own lives: this respects them 
as “ends in themselves,” whereas forcing them to live 
treats them as a “mere means” toward our ends, not 
their own. 
Passive euthanasia can also be supported by stating 
conditions when it can be OK to let someone die. We 
begin with an ‘if’ and develop a principle: 
If . . 
(a) someone is dying, and 
(b) is in horrible pain and suffering, and 
(c) that pain and suffering cannot be 
relieved, and  
(d) that person wants to die and says so, and  
(e) informed, thoughtful and caring people agree 
that the person would be better off no longer 
living . . , 
then it can be permissible to let that person die.[4] 
Passive euthanasia, then, can be justified in a variety 
of ways. 
2. Active Euthanasia 
To see why active euthanasia might be permissible, 
we begin by reflecting on why passive euthanasia 
might be OK: it gets people out of their misery and 
respects what they want for their own lives. 
We then observe that these goals can often be 
pursued more directly and immediately by, say, giving 
them an overdose of pain-killing medications. Letting 
people die can take a long time, and that time might 
be full of unwanted suffering. Killing people, when 
they want to be killed, achieves their goals, more 
quickly. 
So, it seems that if passive euthanasia can be 
permissible, so can active. 
3. Objections 
There are many objections to this reasoning. Some 
concern euthanasia in general. 
3.1. Some claim that pain can always be controlled 
and so there is never a need to euthanize anyone. 
However, this insistence that pain can always be 
made bearable is, sadly, not true. 
3.2. Some argue that “miracles” are possible – 
there’s always a chance that someone recovers – and 
so euthanasia is wrong. But making important 
decisions on very unlikely chances is often unwise. 
Most interestingly though, euthanasia would 
never prevent a miracle, especially one of divine 
origins. 
Further objections claim there are important 
differences between active and passive euthanasia, 
making passive permissible but active wrong. 
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3.3. Some argue that it’s always wrong to 
intentionally kill someone, so active euthanasia is 
wrong. In reply, while it’s, at least, nearly 
always wrong to kill people, this is arguably because 
people usually want to live and do not have lives full 
of pain. Perhaps killing can be justified when this is 
not the case.[5] 
3.4. Some argue that allowing active 
euthanasia might put us on a “slippery slope” to 
murdering people who want to live. But this hasn’t 
happened where active euthanasia is allowed, since 
we do and would have safeguards to lessen this 
possibility, as we do with other things that might lead 
to bad results if misused. 
3.5. Some argue that there are important moral 
differences between allowing something to happen 
and doing something or because killing 
someone and letting them die are profoundly 
different, and so passive and active euthanasia should 
be judged differently. But consider this case: 
An aunt will inherit lots of money if her five-year-old 
nephew dies. She plans to drown him in the bathtub 
and make it look like an accident. He just started his 
bath; she’s on her way to the bathroom to drown him. 
She opens the bathroom door and is delighted to see 
that he has slipped in the bathtub and is drowning. 
She watches, ready to push him under if he steadies 
himself and saves his own life. But, as her luck would 
have it, he drowns; she never touches him 
throughout the ordeal. She inherits the money.[6] 
If she claimed that she didn’t “do anything,” she did: 
she stood there, and doing nothing is doing something. 
And letting someone die can be as bad, or nearly as 
bad, and perhaps sometimes even worse than killing 
someone[7]: indeed, a way to kill someone is to let 
them die. So these distinctions are, at least, not clear. 
3.6. A final concern is that especially if active 
euthanasia were allowed, some people could be 
wrongfully killed. This is possible: some people might 
wrongfully break (potentially good) rules. But we 
cannot ignore that if euthanasia is not allowed, it 
might be that some people could be wrongly kept 
alive. Which wrong is more likely? Which wrong is 
worse? 
4. Conclusion 
While death is, arguably, usually bad for the person 
who dies, the goal of euthanasia is to make this less 
bad: the word euthanasia means a “good death.” 
These issues are important, and not just for people 
currently facing hard choices about death. None of us 
knows what will happen to us: at any time, an 
accident or illness might force these issues upon us, 
and so we should engage them more deeply, now.[8] 
Notes 
[1] The discussion and arguments here are largely 
based on James Rachels’ (1941-2003) famous and 
widely-reprinted article “Active and Passive 
Euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine 1975; 
292: 78-80. 
[2] The discussion here concerns what’s 
called voluntary euthanasia, where a person wants 
to die and says so. There are other types of 
euthanasia though. Non-voluntary euthanasia 
involves an individual who neither wants to 
die nor wants to live, e.g., someone who has been 
unconscious for a long time, say in a coma, and we 
have good reason to believe that consciousness will 
never return: they currently don’t 
literally want anything and we usually don’t know 
what they would have wanted, since people usually 
don’t discuss this. What is sometimes 
called involuntary “euthanasia” involves 
someone who wants to live and says so. If such a 
person is let die or killed, this is not euthanasia: in all 
or nearly all cases, this is murder or wrongful killing, 
and so won’t be discussed further here. 
These definitions cover most actual cases of 
euthanasia, but they aren’t perfect. First, 
it could happen that someone said that, if they were 
to fall into a permanent coma, they would very much 
want their body to be kept alive for as long as 
possible, but nobody knows this is what they wanted: 
if they are euthanized, is that involuntary or non-
voluntary? It could also happen that 
someone wants to die, but has no way of 
communicating that (suppose they have an extreme 
form of “locked-in syndrome,” with eye paralysis too, 
so they cannot even blink out messages): if they are 
euthanized, is that voluntary or non-voluntary? 
These cases are unclear, given the characterizations 
above, as are further possibilities of someone who 
wants to die but nobody knows that and someone who 
wants to live but nobody can tell. 
Non-human animals who are judged to have a poor 
quality of life due to serious health problems are 
often (actively) euthanasized: is this best considered 
a form of non-voluntary euthanasia, or potentially a 
different type of voluntary euthanasia? These animals 
have some current wants or desires, unlike a coma 
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patient, but probably don’t have a specific want or 
desire to die, unlike in typical voluntary euthanasia 
cases.  
[3] Consequentialism and Kantianism can be used to 
support euthanasia (although Kant himself might 
have opposed it: Kant’s own judgments on many 
moral issues and the positions on moral issues that 
his theories arguably support sometimes diverge). 
But these theories do urge us to be very cautious 
about bringing about someone’s death, including our 
own. 
Consequentialists would, and should, urge especially 
anyone who doesn’t have a challenging medical 
condition but wishes to die to seek counseling and 
assistance to help find happiness and fulfillment: 
in most cases, this would be better than death for that 
person and for promoting overall happiness. “It gets 
better,” the saying goes: it’s possible for someone to 
be euthanized (passively or actively), or commit 
suicide (is someone euthanizes him or herself, this is 
a type of suicide; if they need assistance to do this, 
this is assisted suicide), whose death is not in their 
own best interest or contributes to the greatest 
overall good. Indeed, some people have wished to die, 
have been prevented from ending their own life, 
come to appreciate their own life later, and then have 
been glad that they had not ended their life when 
they wanted to do so earlier. (However, it’s also 
sometimes true that people want to die, they live, and 
are eventually able to live what they report to be 
fulfilling lives, yet they still they wish they had 
died: Dax Cowart is a well-known case perhaps like 
this). 
And Kantians don’t think that autonomy is 
unrestricted or limitless: just because we want 
something for ourselves doesn’t mean we should get 
it. Kantians firmly reject an attitude of “It’s your life, 
so do whatever you want with it,” since we have 
obligations to respect ourselves (and 
our future selves), given our value as persons, and 
this respect for ourselves could rule out some cases of 
euthanasia and suicide. 
[4] The details of a principle like this, however, take us 
to harder questions about euthanasia, harder than 
those that arise in most circumstances: for examples, 
what if someone wants to die now but isn’t currently 
in horrible pain and suffering, or is expecting to die, 
but many years later after a very slow decline? 
Should anyone else have “say” over your own life or 
judge whether some pain and suffering is “horrible 
enough” for you to reasonably wish to die? If so, who? 
What if someone isn’t dying and doesn’t even have a 
bad medical condition but just finds their life not 
worth living and so wants to die (and so, say, plans to 
starve themselves to death or do other things that 
will result in their death)? These harder questions, 
and others, would need to be addressed for a 
complete defense of this or similar principles and any 
arguments based on them. 
[5] Some might claim that their intention in any 
euthanasia is not to kill anyone: killing is 
an unintended consequence of their real intention, 
which might be to make the patient comfortable. If 
this makes sense, they might claim that they are not 
engaged in any intentional killing, so they aren’t 
violating any moral principle against intentional 
killing. This type of reasoning is related to what’s 
called the “Doctrine of Double Effect.” 
[6] This case is from James Rachels. Here is another 
example that addresses the distinction 
between doing something versus allowing something 
to happen: 
In a deep forest, hiking alone, Adam finds someone 
who has fallen into a deep pit. They ask him to throw 
them a rope so they can climb out. Adam doesn’t and 
they eventually starve to death. Adam learns of this 
on the news but feels fine since, he tells himself, “I 
didn’t do anything there. I did nothing wrong.” 
To most, Adam clearly did something  –  he didn’t just 
allow something to happen – and he did something 
wrong: what he did, standing there not throwing the 
rope, was wrong. 
[7] For tragic reflections that letting someone die can 
be worse than killing them, see Gary Comstock, “You 
Should Not Have Let Your Baby Die,” The New York 
Times, July 12, 2017. 
[8] Thanks to Zach Blaesi, Taylor Cyr, Chelsea 
Haramia, Dan Lowe, Travis Rodgers and Dan 
Peterson for comments on and discussion of this 
essay. 
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